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Abstract 
 
This article examines the significance of digital entrepreneurship in East Asia as informal 
work, based on empirical research in Taiwan and Thailand. Digital entrepreneurs in East Asia 
can be thought of as a new class of “creative workers” who aspire to the neoliberal ideals of 
the West that advocate free markets and individualism. While digital entrepreneurship offers 
low-cost opportunities, it also represents highly precarious careers. The transition to the 
digital economy also means the expansion of the informal economy, which has existed in 
both Taiwan and Thailand. The encouragement of startup ecosystems by respective political 
and economic elites serves to sweet-talk the creative class to participate in precarious work, 
or it may be an open bid to gain market share by incorporating informal businesses. In 
response to the theme of the special issue, this article discusses two contrasting cases and 
considers the significance of digital entrepreneurship as informalisation of work. 
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This article examines the significance of digital entrepreneurship in East Asia, based on 
empirical research in Taiwan and Thailand. The notion of technology has been closely linked 
to American “can-do” optimism and “the late twentieth century […] American values of 
education, innovation, and entrepreneurialism […] adopted by elites the world over” (Ong, 
2006: 173). In the case of Taiwan, which industrialised rapidly in the 1970s to become an 
“Asian tiger”, engineers and computer scientists trained at the prestigious national 
universities in the 1970s and 1980s would go into corporations for lifetime jobs. The 
country’s electronics manufacturing industry has been under threat in recent years. Internet 
and mobile startup entrepreneurs in Taiwan have rejected standard working practices that 
have become untenable in the past decade. For startup founders, therefore, “working for 
oneself” instead of toiling for large companies is about embracing liberal values and 
voluntarily engaging in informal work. The startup ecosystem in Thailand is relatively new 
and is concentrated in Bangkok. Here, it is the Thai power regime and the elites who have the 
freedom to create Thailand’s first logistics system and the e-commerce backbone for the 
digital marketplace, with trends imposed by the global digital agenda (such as fintech and 
biotech), discursively creating an irresistible model for Thai startuppers to follow.  
 
Digital entrepreneurship in these instances has been influenced by the late capitalist 
American (and Western) values while the two nations’ economic and political histories are 
unique. Digital entrepreneurship can be seen as a “lifestyle” choice connected to conspicuous 
consumption and shared global discourse around entrepreneurship rather than economic 
necessity. The transition to the digital economy can also mean the expansion of the informal 
economy, which has existed in both Taiwan and Thailand. The encouragement of startup 
ecosystems by respective political and economic elites serves to sweet-talk the creative class 
to participate in precarious work, or it may be an open bid to gain market share by 
incorporating informal business. In response to the theme of the special issue, this article 
discusses two contrasting cases in East Asia and considers the significance of digital 
entrepreneurship as informalisation of work. 
 
Digital entrepreneurs in East Asia can be thought of as a new class of “creative workers” who 
aspire to the neoliberal ideals of the West that advocate free markets and individualism. 
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While twenty-first century digital entrepreneurship offers low-cost opportunities, it also 
represents highly precarious careers. To understand the new information and creative workers 
of the digital age, we may refer to a large body of research that seeks to examine their “work” 
experiences in a variety of ways, as they are perceived to be knowledge workers (Drucker, 
1999), venture labourers (Neff, 2012) or new model workers (Ross, 2009), performing 
immaterial, cultural work (Gill and Pratt, 2008) and following their passions (Arvidsson et 
al., 2010). In particular, these writers view the new creative workers in the context of risk-
taking, in which the workers are involved in the monetarisation of knowledge while rejecting 
a traditional work structure. Within the discourse of new venture labour, workers are attracted 
to the digital creative sector because it is thought to be “cool, creative and egalitarian” (Gill, 
2002). Angela McRobbie (2015: 38) has recently argued that “creativity is designated by 
current modes of biopolitical power, as the site for implementing job creation and, more 
significantly, labour reform; it is a matter of managing a key sector of the youthful 
population”. McRobbie’s argument relates to the UK and European condition, but it may be 
relevant to understanding the socially mobile, young generations in East Asia as ex-centric 
examples for whom digital entrepreneurship demonstrates new discourses of work and labour 
against a backdrop of new economic realities. 
 
This comparative study responds to both the discussion of the ex-centric creative work raised 
by this special issue, and a rising academic interest of creative workers in the specific East 
Asian contexts (Lin, 2018; Chow, 2017). In this article, we employ the concept of digital 
entrepreneurship to understand sole traders, freelancers, and startup founders. We analyse 
“different social-political contexts, [in which] cultural work becomes historically and 
geographically situated processes” (Lin, 2018: 15). As examples of ex-centric creative work, 
we have two interrelated research questions: (1) how are precarity, informality and networks 
experienced by the new generations of entrepreneurs in Bangkok and Taipei? and (2) how are 
these examples of ex-centric creative work a result of the specific political, economic and 
social contexts? 
 
Research Methods 
 
In 2014, Leung interviewed 60 nascent entrepreneurs and 17 venture capitalists, business 
angels and mentors, and managers of business incubators, accelerators and co-working spaces 
in Taiwan. She conducted social network analysis (SNA) on the startup ecosystem using 
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NodeXL, noting the central role of Taipei-based and international business accelerators and 
venture capitalists among a loose network of nascent tech company founders. In 2016 and 
2017, she conducted further fieldwork within the startup ecosystem, interviewing 
entrepreneurs and managers of business support groups and attending industry events. She 
also observed co-working and hackerspaces in Taiwan. Her fieldwork totalled 13 months. 
Cossu based most of his investigation of the startup scene in Thailand on Hubba, a leading 
co-working space and central to the digital ecosystem in Bangkok. He conducted a three-
month-long piece of ethnographic fieldwork and 15 interviews in 2016 and 2018. He adopted 
a mixed-methods approach that combines qualitative and digital research methods (Rogers, 
2013). This type of research methods mix allowed the researcher to combine granular 
analysis, tracing “the grain of everyday life […] given by the naturally occurring forms of 
social order and cultural forms” (Atkinson, 2017: 11), generating qualitative insights with a 
synthetic view of the complex social worlds in which a subject or a group is embedded 
(Caliandro and Gandini, 2017). In particular, the digital data was gathered using the software 
Netvizz (Rieder, 2013), collecting data from Facebook. Given the platform’s intense and 
widespread adoption in Thailand, this provided consistent and sufficient data to support 
hypotheses formulated through the use of ethnography. While we both employed SNA to 
understand the wider context of the respective ecosystems, we turned to qualitative methods 
(ethnography, observation and interviews) for the fine-grained data. The evidence was 
interpreted with a firm understanding of the social, political, cultural and economic contexts 
of Taiwan and Thailand.  
 
Changing Asia: the two cases 
 
Taiwan 
 
After the Second World War, the Taiwanese population faced difficult economic and political 
transitions that laid the foundations for the country’s history of entrepreneurial activities. The 
indigenous Taiwanese (benshengren) were denied access to the professional and political 
leadership; many benshengren became entrepreneurs to earn a living, resulting in an “unusual 
high percentage of self-employed labor force” (Yu and Su, 2004: 388). Most of the 
businesses started during this period were small, on a micro scale or family-run, including 
street vending and other retail shops and services (Myers, 1984: 521). They created an 
informal economy mostly sustained by the working class, while the middle class and the 
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elites entered corporate and political life. According to a government White Paper published 
in 2018, there were 1.43 million small and medium enterprises in Taiwan, making up 97.7% 
of total enterprises and employing 78.44% of the island’s workforce.1 
 
The country industrialised rapidly in the 1970s to become an “Asian tiger” economy. From 
the early 1980s, the Taiwanese government encouraged foreign high-tech firms and 
supported domestic companies, especially those manufacturing computer hardware, such as 
motherboards, where 95% of the products were exported (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1996: 237). 
The country began to experience a transitional era from the 1990s, when the major 
electronics corporations increasingly faced fierce competition. This led to political change 
and dissatisfaction with policy strategies, such as the signing of the Cross-Strait Service 
Trade Agreement, which had important political ramifications as Taiwan came under threat 
of domination by mainland Chinese identity politics (Harrison, 2014). The fear prompted the 
Sunflower Movement of 2014 (18 March–10 April), during which students in Taiwan 
occupied the government (Legislative and Executive Yuan) building. They protested against 
the passing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement by the ruling KMT (Nationalist) 
party without a detailed review process.  
 
Taiwan’s high-tech industry is particularly dependent on the global trade, and the financial 
downturn in North America and Europe of 2008–9 adversely affected its economy. For 
instance, in the fourth quarter of 2009, the Taiwanese consumer electronics company HTC  
had 4.5% of the global share of the smartphone market, dropping to 4% in the third quarter of 
2012. HTC has since failed to maintain its position among the global leading smartphone 
manufacturers.2 Shares of HTC have lost more than 90 percent of their value since 2011.3 
This, coupled with the weakened domestic economy, which continued to suppress salary 
levels, meant that at the time of Leung’s fieldwork in 2014 and 2016, a Taiwanese college 
graduate might receive an average monthly salary of NT $22,000 (US $715, at September 
                                                 
1 
https://book.moeasmea.gov.tw/book/doc_detail.jsp?pub_SerialNo=2018A01334&click=2018
A01334#. Accessed 14 January 2019. 
 
2 https://www.statista.com/statistics/271496/global-market-share-held-by-smartphone-
vendors-since-4th-quarter-2009/. Accessed 14 January 2019. 
 
3 http://www.forbes.com/profile/cher-wang-wenchi-chen/. Accessed 10 February 2016. 
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2018 exchange rate) (the so-called 22K generation). This has had profound effects on the 
career choices of the new generation. The salaries of the more established workers also 
remain low compared to those in other developed markets in East Asia. Alongside industrial 
restructuring was the perceived lack of opportunities within the traditional technical 
professions, which in the past were favoured by the computer science and electronic 
engineering graduates. These difficulties prompted many graduates to seek alternative 
careers, including in the informal economy. The startup ecosystem, based mostly in the 
capital, Taipei, consists of new enterprises that utilise Internet and mobile technology; 
venture capital funds and investors, some of whom coming from abroad (especially the USA 
and Japan); and business incubators, accelerators and hubs, many supported by the 
government and co-working spaces. The startup model follows the Silicon Valley ethos 
closely—what we will call American Ideological Apparatus—which has been imported 
through those who have been educated or worked in the West and through interacting with 
global capital and business networks.  
 
Thailand 
 
According to scholars (Bello et al., 1998), the economic policies of Thailand since the 1950s 
have created the structural problems that paved the way for the 1997 economic crisis. If the 
first three decades of this strategy were based on import substitution industrialisation, from 
the mid-1980s the country changed its policy to more export-oriented growth. According to 
Studwell (2013), prolonged investment in domestic-oriented manufacturing differentiates 
between the “sound” Asian Tigers, including Taiwan, and the weaker ones (Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand). The key variable is what he defines as “export discipline” 
(Studwell, 2013: xvi), standing for targeted subsidies to firms capable of exporting and 
competing at a global level. This gap is also reflected in how the two different groups of 
“Asian Tigers” recovered after the financial crash triggered by Thailand in 1997. The first 
group reacted promptly, while the second is still lagging behind in their recovery. These 
factors contribute to the contrasting wealth between the groups: the GDP per capita reported 
in 2018 by Taiwan was US $26,520, compared to Thailand’s US $7,570.4 However, over the 
                                                 
4 International Monetary Fund. 
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/TWN/
CHN. Accessed 14 January 2019. 
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last four decades Thailand moved from being a low-income country to a upper-income 
country5, and its economy has recently begun to rapidly grow again, as shown by the 4.8% 
growth reached in the second quarter of 2018. In this context, Thai’s digital ecosystem has 
generated investments for US $500 million6 over the last five years, and represents a lively 
although relatively small ecosystem if compared to some of its neighbours, such as Singapore 
or Indonesia.  
 
The 1997 crisis was preceded by a decade of intense migration within Thailand, especially 
from the rural northeast of the country. Migrants flocked to Bangkok in search of jobs in both 
the informal sector and in the booming tertiary sector. In the aftermath of the crisis, the 
newly-constituted service class was more affected, with hundreds of thousands of lay-offs. 
Workers were left with little choice but to return to their rural areas, and eventually came 
back to the capital to become “self-entrepreneurs” or to take part in the flourishing informal 
economy. They will become key subjects of the digital economy as low-paid service 
providers for the emerging platforms. In terms of education, university graduates constituted 
only 3% of the workforce in the early 1990s (World Bank, 1990). Currently, the trend seems 
radically inverted; recent data (OECD, 2013) show how Thailand has increased access to 
education at all levels, and has managed to display one of the highest rates of graduates 
among Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.  
 
In terms of capital investment, since the 1980s Thailand has received substantial investment 
from Japan and the United States. This trend is still ongoing if we consider the most active 
funds providing economic and social resources to the flourishing Thai digital scene (such as 
500 Startups from the United States and Cyberventure from Japan).7 Notwithstanding the 
rapid industrialisation and the infusion of foreign capital before and after the 1997 crash, the 
wages of Thai workers remained low and the country had one of the highest rates of income 
inequality in the ASEAN region (Bird et al., 2011). The highly controversial Thaksin 
government’s (2001–2006) economic mix of expanded welfare provisions combined with a 
post-Fordist policy of the informalisation of labour had a marked impact, “turning workers 
into free entrepreneurs became the new organising principle of contemporary Thailand” 
                                                 
5 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/thailand/ Accessed 10 October 2018. 
6 https://www.slideshare.net/techsauce/thailand-tech-startup-ecosystem-report-q2-2018-by-techsauce-
107152562 Accessed 10 October 2018. 
7 Techsauce report 2017: https://www.slideshare.net/techsauce/thai-tech-startup-ecosystem-report-2016. 
Accessed 10 October 2018. 
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(Sopranzetti, 2017: 71). Such a principle appealed to both the working and the upper classes. 
The former saw the possibility of emancipation and freedom from corporate jobs, while the 
latter saw themselves as being able to form, in Thaksin’s words, “a new class of 
entrepreneurs who could marry local skills with international technology and hence move up 
the value chain” (Pasuk and Baker, 2002: 3). 
 
In Taiwan, the younger generation of graduates (who are yet to establish themselves within 
large companies and have little to lose) are likely to embrace informality and the risks 
associated with digital entrepreneurship. They choose autonomy over corporate life, which 
often means long hours and low salaries. The informal digital economy, however, contrasts 
with the established working class-run small businesses. While informality has long been a 
feature among migrants to Thai cities, the expansion of higher education and the increasing 
popularity of international schooling has brought aspirant startup entrepreneurs, who are in 
turn supported by the political regimes as a way to manage the economy. Workers become 
absorbed as new entrepreneurs. In both cases, digital entrepreneurship can be analysed as a 
response to the changing economic and political regimes. In the following section, we 
examine our two cases under the central concepts of this special issue: informality and 
precarity, and ex-centric creative work.  
 
Informality and the Taiwanese and Thai Digital Entrepreneurs 
 
In both Taiwan and Thailand, the informal economy has been a long tradition mostly 
associated with the working class, while the middle class and political elites have access to 
the national and global corporations and the public sphere. Digital entrepreneurship on the 
other hand represents a new informal economy that co-exists with the formal economy: 
national and global corporations. Digital entrepreneurship is an informal economic strategy; 
the entrepreneurs are aspirant capitalists, practising what is in effect precarious labour and 
often performing long hours with no formal employment structure, working voluntarily for 
little or no reward. They also tend to rely on informal support, such as the four Fs of startups: 
founders, friends, family and fools. The goals of these companies are frequently not only 
monetary, but may reflect a biopolitical function as an attempt to universalise other human 
values as much as labour value (Arvidsson, 2016). In our respective fieldwork, we seek to 
understand who are the startuppers, why they engage in digital startups and how they 
experience informality as entrepreneurs.  
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Startups in Thailand did not exist before 2012. Rather, like the long history of small-to-
medium-sized businesses in Taiwan, they existed but were not being labelled in this way. 
Statistics on startups in Thailand show an intense rise, from under three founded in 2012 to 
75 in 2016.8 To provide some basic information on the Thai context in which startups 
operate, it is worth noting how half of the population (a total of 67 million) owns a 
smartphone connected with a 3G connection or higher. Facebook is accessed daily by 35 
million Thais, who upload half a billion photos per year on social media—more than in any 
other country in the world. Digital entrepreneurs in the Thai case are mostly under 40, but, 
thanks to an active programme of informal education and socialisation in the startup culture, 
it is not uncommon to meet some of them in their 20s who are still in education and who are 
already working on their own projects. Among the Bangkok digital “scene”, it is common for 
many entrepreneurs to have spent at least six months abroad or to have obtained higher 
education degrees in English-speaking countries. This is also a clear signal that the digital 
bubble is connected to the social elite. According to Cossu’s interviews with insiders in the 
local digital scene, only one in six startups is owned by non-Thai people, but there is a strong 
presence of foreigners in leading roles in the most important firms and startups.  
 
Cossu started his fieldwork in Thailand in March 2016, staying in Hubba, the pioneer of co-
working spaces in Bangkok and one of the main hubs for the startup culture. Most of the co-
workers were freelancers and digital nomads, and a minority are startuppers. Digital 
entrepreneurship, despite its aim to produce virtual products and services, requires a space in 
which small startup teams can work together to create a viable prototype to pitch in a matter 
of weeks or months to potential funders. Furthermore, working in these spaces has more to do 
with a response to isolation (Brown, 2017) than with a spike in productivity or the 
recruitment of key figures for one’s new business (Parrino, 2015). This is underlined by the 
fact that the closed Facebook group that connected all the paying members of Hubba was not 
able to provide three professionals for a new startup created by one of its former members. In 
other words, Hubba is a space for engendering new social and cultural networks, which may 
not have an instrumental function.  
 
                                                 
8 Techsauce report 2017: https://www.slideshare.net/techsauce/thai-tech-startup-ecosystem-report-2016. 
Accessed 10 October 2018. 
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Almost all the digital entrepreneurs in the Taiwan study are relatively young (20–40), are 
unlikely to have significant family responsibilities and can therefore take on a risky venture. 
Class has always played a part in how the population in Taiwan participates in business. At 
the beginning of the country’s economic modernisation, the working class and rural families 
relied on their children to work in the developing manufacturing economies. However, the 
digital entrepreneurs are mostly from the expanding middle class, and this signals how the 
new generations no longer need to support their siblings and parents, unlike their lower-class 
counterparts in the past. These digital entrepreneurs also tend to be highly educated 
university graduates, often with postgraduate degrees; many have work experience with tech 
corporations or other Internet companies (Leung, 2016). Digital entrepreneurship relates to 
changes in the social, cultural and political landscape in Taiwan in numerous ways. The 
startups focus on software development, rather than hardware, which has traditionally been a 
strength of the Taiwanese economy. Instead of the collective drive to enter large corporations 
and companies that are export-oriented, these startuppers shift their preference towards 
working together in small teams. They strive for the engagement of technology in everyday 
life and active participation, as opposed to passive consumption. Internet and mobile startups 
prioritise creativity and quality rather than the mass manufacturing processes of the past. 
Digital entrepreneurs also challenge the schooling system, which encourages conformity. The 
startup culture promotes collaborative production, creativity, team work and leadership skills.  
 
The startuppers embrace the risks of entrepreneurship. Leung (2016), in an article based on 
her 2014 fieldwork, argues that family support is important for nascent businesses, although 
it is sometimes not financial backing or human resources but the influence of the 
entrepreneurs’ economic and social status and emotional support that offers compensation for 
the precarity of venture labour. Social networks are also important for the startup sector, in 
which both weak (relationships within the wider startup ecosystem) and strong (among the 
founding teams and co-workers) ties are vital and utilised. Startup entrepreneurs tend to have 
close relationships with their team members, but they also develop access to different 
networks to increase their own economic and social capital and to counteract the risks. They 
rely on their co-founders and seek business support from the business incubators, mentors, 
venture capital firms and so forth. In this sense, the Taiwanese digital entrepreneurs tend to 
form networks for their instrumental function in a precarious sector.  
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Among the 66 interviewees in Leung’s Taiwan study, 9% were aged 40–49, 44% were aged 
30–39 and 45% were aged 20–29. It is possible, therefore, to consider that there are three 
generations of digital entrepreneurs, each adopting strategies to alleviate the precarious 
conditions of running nascent businesses. Those who were born in the 1970s have mostly 
come from the traditional electronics and manufacturing corporations. Even with the 
downturn in the sector, these entrepreneurs were not pushed, however; they chose to leave 
their stable jobs to start companies. They were the first generation of people in Taiwan to be 
trained and to benefit from the success of the electronics industry, and they have brought 
these experiences to their new digital businesses. In their 40s, many have family 
commitments, but the family units often allow them to take up the risks of entrepreneurship. 
For instance, this company founder (producing a smart electronic product) suggested:  
 
 In our generation, most families have two incomes. My wife has a stable job, so there 
 is not much pressure on me. Even if I don’t make much money [from this business] 
 for a while, we can still sustain ourselves. 
 
This founder worked in the electronics industry for fifteen years after graduating from 
Electrical Engineering at National Taiwan University. He decided to leave his well-paid job 
after researching the entrepreneurial possibilities, took a few months off for ‘a rest’, and 
started the company. His co-founders came from the startup accelerator programme that he 
attended because, despite his work experiences, his social network was relatively limited. His 
savings provided the initial capital for the venture, and as he indicated above, his immediate 
family was stable and financially resourceful enough to enable him to start his company. 
Many of the digital entrepreneurs in their 30s are also graduates in electronic engineering and 
computer science and through a social network based on mostly college and university 
connections, these startuppers try to ameliorate the risks with assistance and support from 
trusted associates (Leung, 2016). This generation recognises their parents’ wish for them to 
gain stable formal employment, but many also see themselves as part of the 22K generation 
and feel it is up to them to bring about changes and innovate despite the risks.  
 
The post-1990s generation is the third group of digital entrepreneurs. Still in their 20s, most 
only graduated a few years ago, and many of the male entrepreneurs have only just 
completed their compulsory military service in Taiwan. Although lacking in social networks 
or lengthy work experience, they share educational, cultural and social capital, especially 
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with colleagues they met while at university. These entrepreneurs understand risks, but are 
yet to establish a career or take on other personal responsibilities; they therefore feel there is 
little or nothing to lose. As one female entrepreneur (music database) said:  
 
If I spend all the money and don’t succeed, I’m still doing things that I like to do. I’ll 
have learned a lot during this time, and will have experienced things and met people I 
won’t otherwise meet if I have a job with a company. 
 
Having come from a comfortable background (both parents are teachers), she is able to 
embrace precarity and justify the entrepreneurial experience as learning experience even if it 
may turn out to be financially unviable. Entrepreneurs like this female founder embrace 
informal economic activities but are unlike the working-class small business owners of the 
past, or those who undertake unpaid housework or undeclared work, which can be 
conceptualised as the opposite to formal work arrangements (Williams and Nadin, 2012: 1–
10). The Taiwanese digital entrepreneurs are able to participate in the startup scenes if they 
have the social and cultural capital and can access networks of like-minded entrepreneurs 
from similar ages and experiences. The younger startuppers have little to lose, and their 
families present a buffer for the precarious nature of starting business ventures.  
 
Networks are similarly important in Bangkok’s startup scene, as is made evident by Cossu’s 
plotting of Hubba’s position within it (Figure 1). The community with the strongest ties to 
Hubba comprises both the local startup scene (StartupWeekend, BangkokStartup.com and 
Ardent Capital, a Thai-based venture capital fund) and the arts and crafts industry, along with 
design and fashion, a key sector responsible for driving a previous wave of innovation in the 
economy (Arvidsson and Niessen, 2015). South of these two groups, we find a cluster that 
can be defined as the “American Ideological Apparatus”, which comprises festivals and 
events (SXSW), funders (500 startups), startups (Uber) and media outlets (TED, TechCrunch, 
Harvard Business Review).  
 
At the centre of Figure 1 we can see a group formed by national telecommunications 
companies that act as brokers for important developers in the real estate, a key sector for the 
Thai economy. While the Taiwanese startup scene can be seen as a response to the 
transformations in the electronics manufacturing industry, the Thai digital startup scene is 
deeply embedded in the state and in the most traditional businesses of the country: developers 
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of real estates and condos. Connecting the network mapping with the qualitative insights, we 
can see how the link between startup ecosystem and the Thai elite is secured by two key 
processes. First, regulations provide that every new business must have a Thai associate; 
second, the state provides the police background checks necessary for the workforce to be 
employable in the platform sector. This furthers the incorporation of whole sectors of Thai 
economy, which—as urban transportation (mototaxis in particular) and the informal 
market—have until now managed to retain a relative autonomy. It is relevant in this sense 
that one of the most influential Thai real-estate developers is partnering with Hubba to 
incorporate a co-working space within one of their new buildings in East Bangkok. This is 
especially important if we consider how we witness, not only the increasing blurring between 
life and work in the digital and creative workforce, but also the possibility that branding 
oneself as a creative worker becomes subordinated to the purchase of a commodified 
lifestyle.  
 
[Figure 1 Social Network Analysis of Hubba Co-working Space] 
 
 
The precarious nature of startup entrepreneurship is compensated by other social and 
economic factors, such as the Thai networks that allow the entrepreneurs to embed 
themselves in the digital culture. In Taipei and Bangkok, most of these startuppers also have 
no family pressure for financial or emotional support, having come from relatively well-off 
backgrounds. Entrepreneurship represents an individualistic lifestyle for the younger 
generations. Leung’s interviewees repeatedly stated that entrepreneurship is about controlling 
their lives. The rejection of stable, corporate life for entrepreneurship demonstrates a new 
kind of informal economy mostly practised by the young, educated and relatively well-off, 
especially those with international experiences, as is made evident by the Thai startuppers, 
while the small informal businesses of the past—street stalls, small family shops—were 
about survival and mostly established by the working class.  
 
In the case of Thailand, although sharing most aspects highlighted in the Taiwan case, the 
abundance of small funding (e.g. 500 tuk tuks) for startups, together with the adherence to a 
competitiveness ideal, apparently dwarfs the significance of strong ties. However, this stands 
in contrast with the relevance of stronger ties within wider but still limited circles. This is the 
case with the development of the e-commerce infrastructure by both local enterprises and 
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Internet giants (Rocket Internet) that has colonised the Thai market platforms thanks to their 
links with the Thai political elite.  Policy advisors in the ministries are key figures in the Thai 
startup scene. The state is also at the forefront if we look at the importance of its role in 
making gig platforms commercially viable; their business model relies on the capacity to 
supply an army of service providers who, to work for the new middle classes of Bangkok, 
must undergo extensive and detailed police clearing. Startups are therefore attempting (and 
succeeding) in co-opting entire sectors of the economy, which has managed to retain a certain 
degree of autonomy notwithstanding the mix of state control and intensive capital 
investments. This strategy targets previously autonomous workers, small business owners 
(co-opted in the app ecosystem that will soon require them to transact on the platforms) and 
the informal economy of street markets. During the interview with a leading figure of a 
Malaysian media company (the equivalent of Netflix), he clearly stated how his company’s 
business strategy was to push the pirate DVD sellers out of the market by aggressively 
attacking them on price. Their capital allowed them to suffer initial losses caused by 
undercutting their monthly subscriptions to match the cost of a single DVD sold on the 
market.  
 
In both the Taiwanese and Thai startup scenes, therefore, informality is accentuated by the 
middle class social networks, which are encouraged and co-opted by the state (or political 
elites) as an economic move. In the Taiwanese case, this has translated into the middle class 
entrepreneurs’ experiment with an informal career in the face of a lack of opportunities in the 
formal tech sector. However, by doing so, these entrepreneurs absent themselves from 
mainstream political and economic life. One startup founder (games) said: “The young 
generation want to try new things. If we are going to get angry with the government, we may 
as well do something ourselves.” What the founder represented was entrepreneurship as a 
response by the young and disaffected generation: an alternative to political action. Thus, not 
only is digital entrepreneurship an alternative to the traditional hardware industry and 
corporate life, but it is also a subversion of collective struggle in times of political, economic 
and social difficulties. Risks are proffered as an individual life choice and a form of personal 
empowerment, which also signals autonomy and freedom for those who aspire to a neoliberal 
Western lifestyle. The startuppers see themselves as embracing entrepreneurial ideals 
(identifying opportunities, creating ideas and innovating). The rise of digital entrepreneurship 
in Taiwan and Thailand demonstrates the spread of the neoliberal ideal (Ong, 2006) that 
individualises the response to political, economic and social issues. Even with the ethos of 
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changing the world, the digital entrepreneurs’ objective is divorced from political change 
(activism) in the public sphere. 
 
However, digital entrepreneurship in our cases complicates the assumption of precarity in 
creative work; the precise conditions through which precarity arises, and the ways in which 
the workers (in these cases the entrepreneurs) respond to the precarious conditions, are rarely 
addressed. In our studies, the specific class hierarchy, intersecting with age, and the 
respective state’s political imperatives serve to explain the attraction of these new modes of 
informal economic activities. Precarity, in our cases, paradoxically overlaps with a sought-
after lifestyle that allows the startuppers to escape the discipline and the imperatives of 
normativity. Precarity represents the indirect consequence of an attempt to escape the rigidity 
and/or the decline of the corporate world. In the Thailand case, precarity in its digital 
economy ecosystem is mitigated by its relatively-conscious adoption by segments of society 
that can endure its negative externalities: the Thai elite and the wider group of digital nomads 
and co-workers that populate the digital economy scene. At the same time, the peculiar 
linkage between the state elites and the startup ecosystem appears as a driving force capable 
to subsume entire sectors in their valorisation processes, rendering labour conditions more 
precarious. Precarity in the Taipei startup culture is a luxury that can be afforded by the 
middle class as an alternative to political participation, which is encouraged by the states’ 
support for the new media sector. The networks built around the startups allow the 
entrepreneurs to mitigate the risks through support by close colleagues and co-founders or by 
the wider ecosystem, including international startup support, especially the American 
Ideological Apparatuses, venture funds and political intervention. This point will be taken 
further in the next section in order to consider the significance of the globalisation of the 
entrepreneurial narratives in these two East Asian examples. 
 
The Ex-centric Digital Entrepreneurs 
 
In Taipei and Bangkok, we find rising middle classes lured by the cool and creative discourse 
of “good work” (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011: 280) to participate in digital 
entrepreneurship as a bid to being global, which reflects the optimism and neoliberal ideal 
originating from Silicon Valley (Ong, 2006; Ong and Roy, 2011). Since the 1990s, the 
creative industries have been encouraged in the West for developmental goals, engendering a 
universal ethos for the celebration of “creative work”. In our examination, creative work 
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represents specific national and local responses to the social, economic and political 
conditions. Despite the different developmental stages of the Thai and Taiwanese economies, 
they are ex-centric to the examples from North America, Europe and the “sound” Asian 
metropolis of Tokyo. The startup culture in our case studies reflects the desire to participate 
in the world economy, encouraged by the increasingly valued ethos of individualism.  
 
Many of the entrepreneurs in Taiwan are the first generation in the country who have grown 
up alongside the advent of the Internet, and many are inspired by the possibilities of Internet 
and mobile technology as they are experienced in North America, especially Silicon Valley. 
Several of Leung’s interviewees mention the careers of American tech entrepreneurs, such as 
Mark Zuckerberg and Steve Jobs, who provide the inspiration for their own digital 
entrepreneurship. This reflects the fact that they share the optimism associated with 
technology originating from the West, especially Silicon Valley, as well as the neoliberal 
narratives of creative work and entrepreneurship. These entrepreneurs exemplify how startup 
culture in developing and developed economies in Asia has become an ideological apparatus 
imported from the West. The Taiwanese startuppers see entrepreneurship as the beginning of 
change, a way to independence, as this founder suggested: “I hope this company will 
empower its members. You can freely do things you want to do.” Many of Leung’s 
interviewees expressed a similar desire to contribute to society, which is analogous to the 
“change the world” optimism seen in the Silicon Valley tech sector (Packer, 2013).  
 
The strong presence of “digital nomads” in Bangkok, especially from America, Europe 
(mostly France) and Japan, is key to understanding the importance of how the digital lifestyle 
model is also fuelled and reinforced in informal, everyday practices. In fact, the institutional 
events and meetings in the startup scene often host Western experts who offer coaching in 
how to attain success in the digital economy, or Thai entrepreneurs who advise the local 
crowd on the functioning of Silicon Valley based on their first-hand experience. From the 
interviews Cossu had with insiders, he developed an understanding of the “double velocity” 
in the Thai digital economy. On the one hand, we have a temporality on the scale of years, or 
the time required to build the backbone for e-commerce. If these changes can be seen as part 
of digital modernisation (in terms of infrastructure and culture), on the other hand the yearly 
trends imposed by the digital global agenda discursively create an irresistible model for Thai 
startuppers to follow. In 2016, the global trend was fintech, although each region had a 
specificity that reflects the economic imperatives of a country or its role in the world 
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economic landscape. In fact, as Hong Kong pursues the trend from a hedge fund perspective 
and Taiwan attempts to revitalise its export-oriented manufacturing industry through 
hardware-software integration, Thailand is following the more consumer-oriented trend.  
 
Therefore, while digital entrepreneurship in Taiwan and Thailand suggests a new worldview 
and a “creative lifestyle” adopted by a generation with educational, cultural and social 
capital, the startup culture is also heavily influenced by the global discourse of innovation 
and creative work. At the same time, the Internet and mobile startup entrepreneurs in both 
countries react to the economic and political climates in their countries by rejecting standard 
working practices that have become untenable in recent decades. Digital entrepreneurship is a 
lifestyle choice connected to conspicuous consumption and a shared global neoliberal 
discourse rather than economic necessity. For the founders, “working for oneself” instead of 
toiling for the large companies is about embracing the model of liberal values. One of the 
Taiwanese interviewees advocated an approach to social change as individual responsibility:  
 
If more and more people want to change, then the environment will change. It’s not 
about being angry with your parents, or angry with your government; but, can we start 
from ourselves?  
 
The idea that digital entrepreneurship is a means to effect change may be explained by how 
these startuppers feel alienated from the long-established tech corporations while embracing 
the informal economy via the startup culture. This ethos towards work and career has become 
an individual choice rather than a collective quest, despite the grand rhetoric of changing the 
world. Given the middle class and elite background of the proactive part of digital economy 
and its support by the state and the key players of the economy, the emergence of the digital 
economy revises the original understanding of the informal economy (made up of small 
businesses and traditional services established by the working class).  
 
The informal economy, in the Thailand case, represents a formerly liberated sector from 
corporate power (Sopranzetti, 2017), which currently endures a colonisation by control 
mechanisms (Deleuze, 1992) over the digital media and platform labour. Informality, in this 
context, loses its capacity to constitute a realm of alterity vis-à-vis the mainstream labour 
market, and, informality only persists in a highly instrumental and codified form that we have 
witnessed in the Thai digital economy scene, a finding that appears in line with the European 
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experiences. Precarity, coupled with a fundamental loss of autonomy, is precisely produced 
by those start-ups that are contributing to ‘policing’ the working class while they work in the 
new digital platforms, or the mainstream economy is openly attempting to gain market share 
by targeting entire economic and social sectors on a highly asymmetrical ground. In the 
Taiwanese case, the young and highly educated founders follow the Western ideal in their bid 
to find an alternative lifestyle to a corporate life that has become increasingly unattainable. 
By doing so, these young, middle class entrepreneurs absent themselves from the political 
realm in their own national contexts, instead turning to precarious creative work as an 
alternative to economic difficulties and voluntarily subsuming themselves into the new 
informal economy, and therefore enlisting in the new economic and social realities as 
Agamben’s “bare-lives” (1998). The relevance of this concept is key, as Agamben’s Homo 
Sacer describes the contemporary political order as giving priority to the biological fact of 
life (zoē) over the way in which a life is lived (bios). It is a key concept for capturing how 
workers (and entrepreneurs) barely survive through their labour, but are excluded from the 
political life of the country. In both cases, we witness the respective states’ attempt to co-opt 
local digital businesses in the transition to the platform economy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The rise of the digital startup sector in Taiwan is a response to the country’s decline as a 
competitor in computer and mobile phone manufacturing. The interviewees in Taipei are 
knowledge workers who have embraced the risks of the informalised work. Even though 
these nascent entrepreneurs are aspirant capitalists, they share the same struggles as 
precarious creative workers; their ability to withstand risks has been ensured by the support 
of their families, and their desire to change their own work and personal life is partly fuelled 
by the entrepreneurialist sweet-talk. The intersections between class and age explain the 
experiences of the digital entrepreneurs who attempt to effect change as individuals under 
difficult economic climate.  
These instances of digital entrepreneurship share an enthusiasm for the late capitalist 
American (and Western) values adopted by those who have educational, social and cultural 
capital. In the Thai case, this means the political elite and the emerging middles class. In 
contrast to the Taiwanese startup scene, we argue that the emergence of the digital economy 
in Thailand represents a direct attack on the informal economy, the subsuming of their “bare-
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lives” or an attempt to co-opt local businesses in the transition to the platform economy. The 
encouragement of the startup ecosystems by the political and economic elites is about 
encouraging the creative class to participate in the new digital platform, or an open bid to 
gain market shares by targeting informal business on an asymmetrical ground. 
The promises of digital entrepreneurship—flexibility, autonomy and creativity—have 
encouraged the younger generations in East Asian countries such as Taiwan and Thailand to 
take risks. While the informal economy has long existed in these East Asian countries, tech 
startups belong to a new informal economy populated by young middle class graduates, many 
of whom have international study and work experience. Our study examines digital 
entrepreneurs in Taipei as creative workers who have rejected the security of corporate life. 
and embrace precarity, enabled by their cultural and economic capital, and supported by the 
startup networks. They are also following the Euro-American neoliberal ideals imported via 
the startup culture as American Ideological Apparatus, embracing entrepreneurialism as an 
individual quest to de-shackle themselves from a traditional working life. As the Taiwanese 
and Thai economies have moved beyond subsistence, the well-off, prompted by the digital 
revolution, are able to pursue capitalist, neoliberal aspirations. At the same time, the informal 
work culture in these two countries occupies a relatively marginal economic position. The 
digital entrepreneurs have engaged in the pursuit of an “industrious” revolution (Arvidsson, 
2017), unable to create monetary value in most of the nascent companies, rendering 
themselves vulnerable to the national political and economic strategies and to the power of 
the global tech corporations. This is particularly pronounced in the case of the new informal 
workers in Thailand. Using Agamben’s concept of bare-lives, we question the significance of 
the urban creative class of the Euro-American experience as it is transposed to the East Asian 
context. In response to the theme of the special issue, the universalising discourses around 
precarity and informality are challenged when we scrutinise the work practices against the 
backdrops of specific economic and social histories, as we have done in the case of Taiwan 
and Thailand. 
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